CONTRIBUTIONS: The consequences of the recent ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by Cote d’Ivoire, By Ana-Maria Ghineţ

The consequences of the recent ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by Cote d’Ivoire

By Ana-Maria Ghineţ 

On 15 February 2013, Cote d’Ivoire deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Côte d’Ivoire was one of the first States to sign the Rome Statute and became the 122nd State Party to ratify it. Côte d’Ivoire had previously, on 18 April 2003, filed a Declaration by which it recognized the jurisdiction of the Court, this coming after the violence resulting from the disputed presidential and legislative elections, in particular in relation to the crimes committed since March 2004 on its territory.[1] Interestingly, the government of then-president Laurent Gbagbo was the one that recognized the jurisdiction of the ICC on the territory of Côte d’Ivoire under Article 12 of the Rome Statute.[2] Cote d’Ivoire had, also, on 14 December 2010, committed to cooperating fully with the ICC, Previously, in 2003, the Ivorian Constitutional Court ruled that the ratification of the Rome Statute was not in line with the country’s Constitution, which implied that the treaty could only be ratified with the amendment of the Constitution.[3] Thanks to the assiduous work of civil organizations and to the internal support of politicians, a bill was passed in 2012 which allowed for the Rome Statute to be ratified by Cote d’Ivoire.

A preliminary examination of the events in the Cote d’Ivoire was carried out by the ICC from 2003 until June 2011 and it was requested that an investigation that included the violence resulting from the disputed presidential election in 2010 be made. Also, in 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber III of the ICC decided to expand its authorization for the ICC prosecutor’s investigation in Côte d’lvoire to include crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed between 19 September 2002 and 28 November 2010.[4] Two arrest warrants have so far been issued for crimes against humanity, for Laurent Gbagbo and Simone Gbagbo.[5] Laurent Gbagbo was transferred to the ICC on 30 November 2011 and is prosecuted for the crimes against humanity committed in Côte d’Ivoire between 16 December 2010 and 12 April 2011 following the disputed presidential election of 28 November 2010.

Consequences for Cote d’Ivoire:

• As a state party to the Court, Côte d’Ivoire has the obligation to cooperate with the Court in arresting and sending any ICC suspect to The Hague, including Simone Gbagbo, who is still at large. Also, it cannot harbor any other ICC convict which may happen to be on its territory;
• If the prosecutor’s ongoing investigation of the crimes committed in Cote d’Ivoire finds the current president, Alassane Ouatarra, guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, Cote d’Ivoire will have to submit him to ICC for a trial regarding his supposed crimes;
• The actual president and other high-level officials can be prosecuted by the ICC  for any crimes committed between 2003 and 2013 exactly because Cote d’Ivoire recognized the ICC’s jurisdiction since 2003, so that the general rule (art.11 of the Rome Statute) according to which the ICC has jurisdiction only for the future, from the ratification of its Statute, does not apply to Cote d’Ivoire;
• Cote d’Ivoire commits to pursue and convict at a national level the crimes against humanity, war crimes etc committed on its territory starting from the recognition of the ICC’s jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the ICC being only complementary to that of the states themselves. Therefore, Cote d’Ivoire should start a process of identifying and prosecuting those responsible for gross violations of human rights, failing which the ICC can deal with these aspects (article 17 of the Rome Statute);
• Any crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes which will be committed starting from the 15^th of February onwards can be investigated freely by the ICC, without any referral from the Security Council, a State Party being needed (article 13 of the Rome Statute);

Insight in the ongoing conflict in Cote d’Ivoire:[6]

 

For thirty-three years (1960-1993), after gaining independence from France, the Ivory Coast was led under a one-party rule by the totalitarian leader Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The severe economic problems following the downfall of the cocoa market led to a rise in unemployment and heavy protests in Cote d’Ivoire. Multi-party elections were first held in 1990, when Boigny was elected after an unfair election, during which he faced Laurent Gbagbo as main opponent.

After his death, in 1993, the new president, Bédie, former president of the National Assembly, “began promoting many Baoule officers to key posts while sidelining army officers who had worked their way through the Boigny regime, effectively dividing the army and creating major tensions among the ranks.” Thus, junior officers and senior officers, including former General Guéï, mutinied against Bédie, overthrowing him from his post in 1999. General Guéï promised a new election and ran himself in this election, alongside Laurent Gbagbo, with the Supreme Court formally excluding any other opposition from the race. Gbagbo won the race, though Guéï refused to leave power, claiming himself as rightful winner. Massive popular protests ensued and Gbagbo was brought into power.

In 1999 there was a coup attempt by junior officers, causing several weeks of intense fighting in September 2002. The insurgent groups came together led by Guillaume Soro and gained control of the northern 60 percent of the country, effectively splitting the country in two. The fights continued until January 2003, when the Linas-Marcoussiss peace accords were signed, “officially freezing the conflict”.  Still, violence continued in Cote d’Ivoire, with the fight culminating in Gbagbo’s government beginning bombing supposed rebel bases in the North, including a French base, killing nine French soldiers and one aid worker. A national election first scheduled for 2005 was several times postponed, until 2010.

“The first round of elections on October 31, 2010 ran fairly smoothly, with Gbagbo and Ouattara winning the right to challenge each other in the second round, as neither won a majority vote. Despite the talk of reunification of the armed forces, the country entered the second round on 28 November 2010 elections as a country essentially still split in two, with two armies and two completely separate chains of command. Almost immediately following the disputed results, the Integrated Command Centre dissolved and security forces became partisan participants in the crisis.”[7] Ouattara was proclaimed as winner with 54% of the votes. The Constitutional Council immediately proclaimed the results as invalid and proclaimed Gbagbo as the victor, after nullifying the results in seven disputed northern territories. Gbagbo was sworn in as the new President and clashes between Gbagbo loyalists and opposition supporters ensued. The UN and the vast majority of the international community were quick to denounce Gbagbo and claim Ouattara as rightful President. Soro and Ouattara called for an international military intervention to remove Gbagbo from power. Gbagbo concentrated his forces and weaponry primarily in Abidjan and Yamoussoukro to prevent a possible attempt by ex-rebels to march on these cities and also to stifle possible massive popular protests in heavily populated areas. International sanctions and blockades attempted to limit Gbagbo’s ability to pay the FDS and civil servants and force him to step down from power, with devastating effects on the population. Outarra formed private forces, called FRCI, to claim back presidency.

On 28 March 2011, Ouattara declared that all peaceful solutions had been “exhausted” and forces loyal to him began an assault on Yamoussoukro. By 31 March, the FRCI had taken the majority of the country and were moving in on Abidjan. The FRCI were alleged to have committed several abuses during the offensive, as were the loyalist forces. Gbagbo was captured on 11 April 2011 in his residence by the FRCI following heavy aerial bombardment by the UN and Licorne forces. Battles, violence and abuses continued in several areas, preventing hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons from returning to their homes. On 31 May Ouattara was formally sworn in as President in Yamoussoukro, amid sporadic fighting and continued abuses. Until now no Ouattara supporters have yet been charged or imprisoned for their part in abuses during the crisis.

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[1] ICC Press Release – “Côte d’Ivoire ratifies the Rome Statute”, available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr873.aspx

[2] F.Dako, L.Gueye, “Côte d’Ivoire and the ICC: What hope for the victims?”, on http://ijcentral.org/blog/cote_divoire_and_the_icc_what_hope_for_the_victims/

[3] Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Côte D’Ivoire Ratifies the Rome Statute, Joining the International Criminal Court”, 15 February 2013

[4] All Africa, “Cote d’Ivoire: ICC Expands Scope of Côte d’Ivoire Investigation to 2002-2010”, 22 February 2012, available at:http://allafrica.com/stories/201202241471.html

[5] See the charges for both accused on:  http://icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/Situations%20and%20Cases/Situations/ICC0211/Pages/situation%20index.aspx

[6] Based on the Conflict Profile for Cote d’Ivoire which can be found on: http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/ivory-coast/conflict-profile/

[7] http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/ivory-coast/conflict-profile/